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It is considered a “myth” that non-acceptance of scientific consensus on emotive 14 
topics is owing to difficulties processing scientific information and is, instead, 15 
owing to belief-associated psychological conflicts, the strongest non-acceptors 16 
being highly educated. Do these results from adults explain variation in response 17 
to school-level teaching? We studied a cohort of UK secondary school students 18 
(ages 14-16) and assessed their acceptance and understanding of evolution.  In 19 
addition, to address their aptitude for science we assessed their understanding of 20 
genetics and their teacher-derived assessment of science aptitude. As both 21 
models predict, students with low initial evolution acceptance scores showed 22 
lower increase in evolution understanding. Contra to conventional wisdom, this 23 
effect is better explained by lack of aptitude: before teaching, students with low 24 
acceptance had lower understanding of both evolution and of genetics; the low 25 
acceptance students sat disproportionately in the foundation (rather than higher) 26 
science classes; low acceptance students showed lower increments in genetics 27 
understanding; student gain in evolution understanding correlated positively with 28 
gain in genetics understanding. We find no evidence either for a role for 29 
psychological conflict in determining response to teaching or that strong rejectors 30 
are more commonly higher ability. From qualitative data we hypothesise that 31 
religious students can avoid psychological conflict by adopting a compatibilist 32 
attitude. We conclude that there exist students recalcitrant to the teaching of 33 
science (as currently taught) and that these students are more likely to not accept 34 
the scientific consensus. Optimizing methods to teach the recalcitrant students is 35 
an important avenue for research. 36 
 37 
 38 
 39 
  40 
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Why do some people reject the scientific consensus on certain subjects (e.g. vaccines, 41 
evolution and climate change)?  Convention holds that strongly held beliefs about a 42 
subject, religiously or politically motivated, prohibit effective understanding1 of that 43 
subject owing to psychological conflicts.  This can be owing to cognitive dissonance2,3, a 44 
desire to hold the same beliefs as those with whom we have ties4, or avoidance of 45 
damage to perception of self worth5,6. When such denial or selective adsorption of the 46 
evidence7 is commonplace, establishment of an unbiased understanding4 is likely to be 47 
difficult. Such effects could explain the negative relationship between religion and 48 
scientific literacy1. That prior non-empirical world-views (i.e. beliefs) colour the 49 
processing of information that conflicts with that world-view is not, however, unique to 50 
one demographic: US Democrats believing that the surge in Iraq didn’t work don’t 51 
process well evidence to the contrary, while Republicans don’t fairly process climate 52 
change evidence5.  53 
 54 
An alternative possibility is that the rejection of scientific consensus reflects a general 55 
inability to process complex arguments and evidence, or a deficit in knowledge8-11. 56 
However, at least in adults, the most vehement science-deniers tend to be highly 57 
educated12-14. Indeed, the notion that those who don’t accept the scientific understanding 58 
are those who struggle to understand the science, has been described as one of the 59 
“myths15” of public understanding of science. However, Pew research, for example, 60 
report that as regards the question of whether humans are the product of evolution, an 61 
increasing proportion of individuals agree with the scientific view as science education 62 
attainment levels increase16.  This could, however, reflect avoidance of science education 63 
owing to psychological conflicts.  64 
 65 
Understanding of the relative roles of poor understanding and psychological conflicts 66 
comes in large part from studies on adults (and predominantly in the US).  Do these 67 
results transfer to the secondary school classroom (in the UK)? In classroom teaching of 68 
science there will be students who are less able to process scientific information as 69 
usually taught8. Is this associated with low acceptance as well?  Conversely, might prior 70 
beliefs restrict learning outcomes and might this be especially acute for some 71 
academically more able students12-14?  That one can teach the mechanics of evolution to 72 
students, whether they accept or reject the scientific consensus17, suggests that the prior 73 
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beliefs need not always be a hurdle. N.B. for the distinction between belief and 74 
acceptance18 see Supplementary note 1. 75 
 76 
Does then aptitude or psychological conflict best predict student responses to teaching 77 
of contentious subjects? We address this issue in the specific context of the teaching of 78 
evolution to a UK-based cohort (number of students=1227, number of classes = 70) of 79 
secondary school children (ages 14-16). The schools were derived from both the state 80 
and private system and comprised a large breadth of social, religious and economic 81 
demographics19. Teachers were blinded to the aim of this study. For further details see 82 
Methods and prior paper19.    83 
 84 
Evolution as a subject is known to be difficult to teach for multiple reasons2,8,20-22.  Two 85 
aspects are important in the current context. First, the concepts within evolution are hard 86 
and abstract8.  Second, some people have a prior non-acceptance of the scientific view of 87 
evolution2,17. Non-acceptance includes both those actively rejecting the scientific 88 
consensus and those undecided. 89 
 90 
Both psychological conflict2,20 and aptitude models predict that a student’s improvement 91 
in understanding of evolution through instruction would be predicted by their degree of 92 
acceptance of evolution prior to teaching.  The aptitude model proposes that some 93 
students struggle with science, possibly owing to poor logical reasoning skills23,24, and so 94 
are confused about evolution, a confusion that results in both poor understanding and 95 
poor acceptance25-27.  This model thus also predicts that the ability to improve 96 
understanding of a less emotive but related subject will also be predicted by the 97 
acceptance of evolution prior to tuition. By contrast, the psychological conflict model 98 
predicts that a student’s prior rejection of the scientific view of evolution should not 99 
predict their ability to understand the less emotive subject.   100 
 101 
“Less emotive” in this context can mean one of two things:  either that the subject 102 
matter is uncontentious or that any debate is uncorrelated with the possible belief-based 103 
foundations of the non-acceptance of evolution. Here we employ basic genetics 104 
understanding (DNA, mutation, Mendelism etc.) as that less emotive but related subject.  105 
Fundamental genetics is a good comparator, it being uncontentious, abstract but still a 106 
close intellectual relative of evolution. Further, aspects of genetics considered to be 107 
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contentious (notably genetic modification) are uncorrelated with political or religious 108 
belief systems28.  The same is not true for evolution, climate change, stem cell biology or 109 
the big bang, where religious/political stance correlate28.   110 
 111 
Here then we ask whether a student’s degree of acceptance of evolution, prior to being 112 
taught evolution, predicts their pre- and post- teaching understanding of evolution alone 113 
or genetics as well. We also ask whether teacher-assessed general science ability predicts 114 
pre-teaching acceptance of evolution. If evidence from adults translates to school 115 
children, the conflict model also predicts that amongst the highest ability students there 116 
exists a discrete and larger subpopulation of low acceptors4,12-14. We thus ask whether 117 
acceptance levels prior to teaching accord with science ability as classified by teachers, 118 
and whether in higher ability classes we see evidence for an especially large 119 
subpopulation of low acceptors. 120 
 121 
RESULTS 122 
 123 
Students with low prior acceptance of evolution have lower prior understanding of 124 
evolution and of genetics 125 
Consistent with both models, students with low prior acceptance of evolution have lower 126 
understanding of evolution prior to formal teaching (rho = 0.22, P=9 x 10-15; Fig 1).  The 127 
aptitude model in addition predicts that pre-teaching acceptance will also predict pre-128 
teaching understanding of genetics.  This is indeed the case (rho=0.43, P<2.2 x 10-16). 129 
Similarly, a lower understanding of genetics is correlated with a lower understanding of 130 
evolution (rho=0.20, P=3 x 10-12). 131 
 132 
Students with low prior acceptance of evolution are more common in foundation 133 
science classes 134 
The general aptitude model also predicts that the students with low acceptance of 135 
evolution prior to teaching will be those of lower “ability”4.  Classes were stratified (by 136 
teachers) into those doing foundation level GCSE versus those of higher ability (this 137 
being across all sciences, not just biology).  Higher ability students indeed have a higher 138 
acceptance of evolution prior to teaching (Mann Whitney U test, P=9 x 10-11; Fig 2). 139 
Similarly, the higher ability students had higher genetics understanding (Mann Whitney U 140 
test, P=1.7 x 10-15) and evolution understanding (Mann Whitney U test, P=0.03), prior to 141 
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teaching. These results suggest that the students with lower acceptance of evolution may 142 
tend to be lower ability students with lesser understanding of science more generally, of 143 
which evolution understanding is but one component.  This contrasts, for example, with 144 
evidence regarding climate change denial in adults4. 145 
 146 
No evidence for a larger subpopulation of rejectors in the higher ability classes 147 
While the above indicates that higher ability students tend to accept evolution more than 148 
foundation students, if some academically more capable people are more likely to adopt 149 
strong anti-science positions (as is the conventional wisdom4,12-14), we expect to see 150 
evidence of more strongly divided opinions in the higher ability class. Divided opinions 151 
should be reflected in a tendency to bimodality in the distribution of acceptance scores 152 
and a higher frequency of low acceptors.   153 
 154 
An efficient measure of deviation from unimodality is the dip29 score (lower dip scores 155 
are more unimodal).  As the score is sensitive to sample size, we subsample from the 156 
1055 higher ability students a random 172 students (the size of the foundation 157 
population).  The median dip score of 10,000 random subsamples is 0.0407 (95% CI 158 
0.0348-0.0509), identical to the dip score of the foundation class.  After teaching, the 159 
unimodality of acceptance scores is also not significantly different (post-teaching median 160 
dip of higher class subsamples = 0.0407, 95% CI 0.0343-0.0494, dip of foundation 161 
class= 0.0349). The higher and foundation classes thus have the same (negligible) 162 
deviation from unimodality.   163 
 164 
The frequency of evolution rejectors is also no different between higher and foundation 165 
classes. The percentage of students with a preteaching acceptance score ≤32 (the cut-off 166 
for “low” acceptance30) are the very similar in the higher and foundation classes (1.04% 167 
in higher ability, 1.16% in the foundation classes: Fisher’s exact test, P=0.70, odds ratio 168 
=0.90). The same applies after teaching (1.2% in high ability, 1.16% in foundation class: 169 
Fisher’s exact test, P=1, odds ratio =1.06). We conclude that we find no evidence for a 170 
greater polarization in acceptance, or for a greater frequency of strong evolution 171 
rejectors, when ability is high.  172 
 173 
Students with low acceptance of evolution before teaching respond poorly to 174 
evolution teaching 175 
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A prediction of both models is that the students with initial lower acceptance of 176 
evolution are less receptive to evolution teaching.  The fact that students with low 177 
acceptance also have lower ability and lower understanding prior to teaching introduces a 178 
statistical difficulty, in so much as, owing to a ceiling effect, a student’s preteaching score 179 
in evolution understanding by necessity is negatively correlated with their absolute 180 
change in score: rho=-0.53, P < 2 x 10-16. We correct the change in understanding of 181 
evolution scores by considering the residuals of the loess regression of change in 182 
understanding of evolution versus preteaching understanding scores (Fig 3). These 183 
residuals scores do not correlate with preteaching understanding of evolution scores 184 
(rho=-0.018, P=0.52) and thus may be considered a normalised measure of response to 185 
evolution teaching. As expected of a discriminating measure, these residuals are higher 186 
for students in the higher ability class (Mann Whitney U test, P=0.013; median higher 187 
ability = -0.076; median foundation ability =-0.17). 188 
 189 
Employing this normalised measure, we find that low initial acceptance predicts a poorer 190 
response to teaching (rho=0.17, P=4.6 x 10-9; Fig 4).  Previously we showed that 191 
students taught genetics before evolution respond better than those taught evolution 192 
then genetics19.  Does a student’s initial acceptance level predict responses in both 193 
cohorts?  We find that it does and similarly is observed in the higher ability classes and 194 
the foundation classes (Table 1).  In a multivariate analysis in which normalized increase 195 
in evolution understanding is predicted by pre-teaching evolution acceptance, teaching 196 
order and ability, we find that all but ability are significant predictors (preteaching 197 
acceptance, estimate=0.02, P=5 x 10-7; order, estimate= 0.33, P=1.5 x 10-5; Ability, 198 
estimate=0.16 P=0.11, adjusted R2=0.041). 199 
 200 
The acceptance-gain correlation is robust to class effects 201 
In the above analyses, we are considering all students in all classes en masse.  Do we find 202 
that controlling for possible class, cohort or teacher effects we still find that pretesting 203 
acceptance levels predict the normalised increment in evolution understanding? We find 204 
that the correlation seen en masse is seen also within classes (Supplementary Table 1), 205 
supporting the hypothesis that students with low prior acceptance also have lower 206 
normalized gain in understanding of evolution, even when just compared against their 207 
class mates.  In addition, this result indicates that differences in the time interval between 208 
pre- and post- testing do not explain the acceptance-gain correlation. 209 
 8 
 210 
Poor response of low acceptance students is not specific to evolution 211 
understanding  212 
Is the poor response to teaching of evolution of low acceptance students associated with 213 
a low responsiveness to teaching of science more generally or evolution in particular? To 214 
address this, we ask whether a student’s preteaching acceptance of evolution predicts 215 
their response to the teaching of genetics.  We consider the residuals of the loess 216 
regression of change in genetics score predicted by initial genetics score (which are not 217 
correlated with preteaching genetic scores: rho=-0.005, P=0.87) and consider these a 218 
normalized response to teaching of genetics. This response to the teaching of genetics is 219 
also predicted by the prior acceptance of evolution (rho=0.15, P=6.4 x 10-8; Fig 5). The 220 
effect is seen when controlling for between-class effects (Supplementary Table S2). It is 221 
also seen for students doing genetics first (rho=0.16, P=4 x 10-6) and those doing 222 
evolution first (rho = 0.10, P=0.04), for those in the higher ability group (rho = 0.11, 223 
P=0.0002) and those in the foundation group (rho=0.29, P=0.0001). In a multivariate 224 
analysis, ability (estimate 0.75, P=0.012), pre-teaching acceptance (estimate 0.079, P=1 x 225 
10-6) and order (estimate 1.07, P=5.5 x 10-7) are all significant predictors of the 226 
normalised improvement in genetics understanding.  Addition of the normalised change 227 
in evolution understanding shows it too to be a predictor (estimate 0.47, P=4.9 x 10-90), 228 
with adjusted R2 = 0.075 (all predictors remain significant).  229 
 230 
Consistent with the recalcitrance of students who don’t accept evolution being owing to 231 
them having a general difficulty in learning about science, students who make larger gains 232 
in understanding evolution make larger gains in understanding genetics (rho=0.2, P=5.3 233 
x 10-13). This is also seen when we consider the correlation on a class-by-class basis 234 
(Supplementary Table 3).  235 
 236 
No evidence for a role for psychological conflict 237 
Above we have considered an extreme version of the psychological conflict model in 238 
which gain in genetics understanding is predicted to have no correlation with preteaching 239 
acceptance of evolution.  A more nuanced model supposes that the relationship between 240 
preteaching evolution acceptance and normalized gain in evolution understanding has a 241 
steeper slope than that between preteaching evolution acceptance and normalized gain in 242 
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genetics understanding.  Only at the limit, if conflict were never an issue, would the latter 243 
slope be zero.  A viable normalized metric of Relative Conflict Strength (RCS) can be: 244 
 245 
RCS = [slope of evolution response – slope of genetics response]/evolution response 246 
 247 
where, for direct comparability, the slopes are derived from a regression of the data 248 
(normalized genetics improvement, normalized evolution improvement, preteaching 249 
acceptance) expressed in deviation from mean in standard deviation units i.e. Z scores. 250 
Strikingly, a unit difference in standard deviation in preteaching acceptance scores 251 
translates to an identical (to two significant figures) 0.16 s.d. increment in both 252 
normalised genetics and normalised evolution understanding, thus giving RCS of zero. 253 
Note that the slope is nonetheless quite shallow. 254 
 255 
Analysis of the correlations supports a similar conclusion.  The correlation between 256 
preteaching acceptance and evolution gain is rho =0.167, while for genetics this is 0.154. 257 
The difference between these two is not significantly different (P=0.73, NPMCS).  Partial 258 
correlation tests support the same conclusion (Supplementary results 1). Teaching order 259 
also has no effect (Supplementary results 2), arguing against possible cognitive conflicts 260 
being carried over when evolution is taught first.  261 
 262 
These results all suggest that psychological conflict has little to no involvement in the 263 
poor response to evolution teaching in low accepting students and that the aptitude 264 
model is more viable. 265 
 266 
No evidence for teacher non-acceptance or poor understanding 267 
Student experience can also be conditioned on teacher non-acceptance21 or reluctance to 268 
teach evolution31.  While above we have controlled for by-class effects, it is helpful also 269 
to recognize that in our UK based setting we found no evidence that teacher non-270 
acceptance was a serious issue. We find that 96% of 123 teachers are classified as 271 
accepting of evolution, 3% are unsure and 1% would be classified as rejectors.  We also 272 
find little or no evidence for poor teacher understanding.  Most teachers were specialist 273 
biology teachers with 72% having a degree in a biology-related subject.  Their 274 
understanding of evolution and of genetics was fairly uniformly high. Over 65% of 275 
teachers answered all questions on evolution correctly and over 70% in genetics.  The 276 
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core concepts of evolution were well understood, with 79% of teachers recognising that 277 
evolution involves genetic changes in time.  However, on more nuanced aspects there 278 
was some small degree of confusion.  A notable minority (11%) considered that 279 
evolution involves the change from simple to complex organisms and there was 280 
confusion as to when life first appeared on earth.   281 
 282 
DISCUSSION 283 
Here we have considered two models regarding the possible causes of failure to accept 284 
scientific consensus.  In the psychological conflict model, prior belief of the lack of 285 
correctness of the scientific explanation preconditions people to being unable to fairly 286 
process information pertinent to that emotive issue.  In the alternative model, the prior 287 
non-acceptance is part of a nexus of low aptitude. In contrast to conventional 288 
wisdom4,12,13,15, we find evidence strongly supporting the aptitude model and no evidence 289 
to support the conflict model, even in its more nuanced form.  Moreover, and again in 290 
contrast to the accepted view4,12-14, we find no evidence that strong rejectors are 291 
predominantly of higher educational attainment. Our results thus suggest that it is not a 292 
“myth”15 that non-acceptance of scientific consensus is connected to knowledge and 293 
aptitude.  294 
 295 
Why don’t we see evidence for psychological conflict? 296 
Why might we not be seeing evidence that psychological conflicts condition student 297 
learning?  One possibility is that there is no conflict, the other is that conflicts are being 298 
avoided. An absence of conflict could come about if young pre-college students’ 299 
attitudes/beliefs are yet to be fully resolved.  This could explain why other studies, 300 
employing adults, find that cognitive conflicts, e.g. on climate change denial (e.g. 5) and 301 
vaccine denial (e.g. 32), are important.  Adults will have had longer to embed their belief 302 
systems into a more coherent framework (e.g. a conspiracy theory view, see33, but see 303 
also correction34 and critique35).  If the problem is a clash between evidence and an 304 
embedded belief system, then we might expect the more plastic developing belief 305 
systems of young adults to be less of an impediment to learning. Whether this is true for 306 
highly proscribed religious-based assertions about evolution is, however, less clear. 307 
Nonetheless, it may well be true that psychological conflicts explain much vehement 308 
science denial in adults, while at the same time science aptitude plays a deeper role in the 309 
developing brain. 310 
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 311 
In this context, an important caveat to our study is that it was performed on UK school 312 
students.  The general level of acceptance of evolution is here high.  The MATE tool36 313 
recommends to classify a person as accepting of evolution if they have a score of 46 or 314 
more.  Under this classification, 78% accept prior to teaching, increasing to 85% after 315 
teaching, with only ~1% falling in the “reject” classification, the others being undecideds. 316 
This compares with the general adult population in the US where only 65% of 317 
respondents agree with the statement that humans evolved over time and 31% believe 318 
that humans have existed in their present form since the beginning of time16.  Assuming 319 
a pressure to believe what an in-group believe4, the pressure to accept the scientific 320 
consensus on evolution in the UK school context, even for religious students, is most 321 
likely stronger than in the US school system (or comparable low acceptance countries 322 
e.g. Turkey).  323 
 324 
Might there be some value in the notion that students can avoid psychological conflict? 325 
To provide hypotheses to explain why conflict was not evident we assembled qualitative 326 
data via focus groups (N=76 students). These suggests that conflict may be being 327 
avoided by religious students in particular adopting a compatibilist intellectual stance, 328 
wherein acceptance of both religion and evolution is considered viable (Supplementary 329 
results 3, Supplementary figure 1). This possibility is worth further research, not least 330 
because it suggests simple interventions to help religious students learn about evolution.  331 
A further possibility is that our measure of conflict-free academic progression is 332 
misleading. We have presumed that genetics is a suitable non-emotive control subject. 333 
Importantly, genetic modification issues are not more emotive to individuals non-334 
accepting of evolution for belief based reasons28. More particularly, the material taught 335 
and examined under genetics is largely non-emotive. Moreover, any notion that 336 
opposition to GM crops explains why those not accepting of evolution show similar 337 
increments in genetics and evolution understanding, fails to explain why low acceptance 338 
students performed less well than accepting students prior to teaching in both evolution 339 
and genetics knowledge tests and why they were classified by their teachers into 340 
foundation ability sciences classes, where this reflected their performance in all core 341 
sciences. 342 
Limits to generalizability 343 
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That our study was UK based, as we suggest, limits the generalizability of our study. 344 
Further, the use of genetics as a comparator limits our ability to generalize the results too 345 
far.  Nonetheless, that low general science ability (classified by teachers) predicts poor 346 
response to teaching (Mann Whitney U test, normalized genetics response by ability, 347 
P=0.0015; normalised evolution response by ability P=0.013), suggests that the 348 
foundation ability students are not responding well to science teaching as currently 349 
practiced. It remains to be seen whether preteaching acceptance of evolution predicts a 350 
response to teaching of science subjects that are not biological and to subjects that are 351 
not scientific at all.  352 
Implications 353 
What implications does our study have? We have found poor response to teaching of 354 
non-accepting students is better explained by aptitude than by psychological conflicts. Is 355 
there much that can be done for those of lower aptitude?  We previously showed that 356 
teaching genetics before evolution is an efficient mechanism to improve evolution 357 
understanding at no cost to genetics understanding, and that the genetics-first approach 358 
was the only ordering that enables an increase in evolution understanding in foundation 359 
classes. Optimization of teaching strategy for different aptitudes (as done in mathematics 360 
education) is worthy of research. Identification of learning styles ((auditory, visual 361 
kinaesthetic etc.) of those of low aptitude may well also help.  Current evidence suggests 362 
that visual (graph based) presentation of information5, rather than textual presentation 363 
may help many, especially visual learners. 364 
The results here also suggest that focusing on acceptance per se is not helpful, as this may 365 
be more a consequence of the nexus of low scientific aptitude, rather than the cause of 366 
poor learning outcome. This thus reinforces the notion that teachers should teach the 367 
science and not focus on belief systems17. This comes with two caveats.  First, it might be 368 
that for religious students, conflict may be avoided by encouraging a compatibilist 369 
position, but this remains to be tested. Second, a robust understanding of the difference 370 
between evidence-based and belief-centred assertions of understanding may be crucial 371 
for helping students understand the difference between science and non-science.  In this 372 
context emphasis in the classroom on evidence-based acceptance of evolution, rather 373 
than “belief” in evolution may be a subtle but important route18. 374 
  375 
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METHODS 376 
Methods for this paper are identical to those we recently reported for our study of 377 
teaching order19.  Here therefore we provide an overview of these methods and advise 378 
the reader to consult the prior paper and its supplements for fuller detail.  379 
 380 
Ethical considerations and data protection 381 
Ethical guidelines as prescribed by The British Educational Research Education37 have 382 
been followed. Particular consideration has been taken when working with school 383 
students, and approaches that place any undue burden on participants have been 384 
avoided. Research through questionnaires and focus groups has taken place within 385 
students’ schools and have involved students’ usual science teachers so as to minimise 386 
undue intrusion. For consent forms see 19.  387 
 388 
Student questionnaire 389 
Quantitative data were collected through a student questionnaire to determine 390 
acceptance of evolution and understanding of genetics and evolution. This was devised 391 
for GCSE-level students (14–16-year-olds) who study evolution and genetics as part of 392 
their science GCSE science course. An advantage of analysis of this age group is that 393 
order effects may well be most easily detected if there has been little or no priming. 394 
While primary school children in the UK are presently expected to be taught basic 395 
genetics and evolution on the national curriculum, this is a recent introduction and the 396 
cohort we analysed did not have this exposure. Indeed, this academic stage was chosen 397 
as it is currently the first, and perhaps only, period at which students have to learn about 398 
evolution. This cohort is not self-selecting in the way that a higher academic stage might 399 
be. For example, students aged from 16−18 and studying for a Biology A-Level 400 
qualification will already have achieved a reasonable standard of academic achievement in 401 
science to enrol in this, and presumably have an interest for biology, or would not have 402 
chosen to study the subject further. Therefore, in choosing to study GCSE-level 403 
students, this research has involved a wide variety of students, in terms of academic 404 
ability and interest in evolution and science. 405 
 406 
For evolution acceptance, evolution understanding and genetics understanding the tests 407 
were performed pretest – prior to learning both genetics and evolution and post-test – 408 
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immediately after learning of both topics.  We consider here only data where a given 409 
student answered all pre and all post tests.  410 
 411 
The questionnaire consists of 25 questions: 13 focus on acceptance of evolution (Section 412 
A), 6 on genetics knowledge (Section B), and 6 on evolution knowledge (Section C). 413 
None of the questions involve extended writing and are all variations of the multiple-414 
choice question. These types of questions were chosen for their practicalities: to aid 415 
student completion time, to avoid instances of not being able to understand 416 
transcriptions, to allow for quantitative analysis of data, and that this method is 417 
commonly used in similar studies (e.g., 21). 418 
 419 
At all stages of the questionnaire development, including a pilot study, evolution and 420 
education experts were consulted from the University of Bath along with practising 421 
teachers. The questionnaire was designed with time constraints in mind: teachers 422 
consulted during its development were insistent that the questionnaire must be short 423 
enough so that its completion would not considerably reduce their lesson time. Ten to 15 424 
minutes was considered an appropriate length. The final questionnaires are presented in 425 
our prior paper19. 426 
 427 
Evolution acceptance. Section A assesses students’ opinions towards evolution and 428 
consists of 13 Likert Scale items. These were based largely on the Measure of Acceptance 429 
of the Theory of Evolution (MATE), which was developed to assess biology teachers’ 430 
acceptance of evolution38 and later, undergraduate students’ acceptance of evolution 36. 431 
The original MATE instrument consists of 20 items spread disproportionately across 6 432 
subsections of evolutionary concepts or aspects. It was decided that this was too long for 433 
school students. Appropriate questions were chosen based on their relevance to these 434 
different aspects of evolution and their accessibility to school-aged students. Given that 435 
the MATE has been developed and tested predominately on teachers and undergraduate 436 
students (e.g., 21,39), some modifications to the language used were needed. Where 437 
necessary, statements were reworded to make them more understandable. Two items 438 
were also based on Lovely and Konderick’s study40 into undergraduate opinions of 439 
evolution. This section was found to be reliable through internal consistency checks 440 
(alpha 0.82, G6 0.83). 441 
 442 
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Acceptance categorisation. Scores for individual items are measured on a scale of 1 to 443 
5, corresponding to “very high acceptance,” “high acceptance,” “undecided,” “low 444 
acceptance,” or “very low acceptance” of evolution. Students receive a total score of 445 
between 13 and 65 (a higher score represents a higher acceptance of evolution). We treat 446 
each score as a quantitative variable, rather than a discrete one.  447 
 448 
 449 
Genetics knowledge. Section B consists of 6 questions which focus on knowledge of 450 
genetics. This includes variations on questions from recent GCSE exams, questionnaires 451 
used in the Genetics Literacy Assessment Instrument (GLAI) for undergraduates 41, and 452 
questions from 42 in their study of school students’ understanding of genetics. Two of 453 
these questions involve choosing or ordering key words from lists provided, and one 454 
question involves ticking boxes. These types of questions were chosen to gain greater 455 
insight into students’ ideas on living organisms and genetics and to add variety to the 456 
questionnaire for students. This section was found to be reliable through internal 457 
consistency checks (alpha 0.77, G6 0.82). 458 
 459 
Evolution knowledge. Section C focuses on evolution knowledge and consists of 6 460 
questions. This section includes a variety of different aspects of evolution, including 461 
natural selection and geological time. Most of these were variations of questions used by 462 
Rutledge and Warden21 in their research into acceptance and understanding of evolution 463 
among high school biology teachers. Additionally, a number of questions were devised 464 
with the assistance of evolution experts. Each question was scored equally with a section 465 
total out of 6. This section was found to be less reliable through internal consistency 466 
checks (alpha 0.25, G6 0.22) but this probably reflects the low number of questions and 467 
the fact that each question was testing a different issue (hence high cross correlation is 468 
not desirable). 469 
 470 
Testing regime. Students were given the same questionnaire before and after teaching 471 
(for which there is precedent, see e.g. 30). While this has the notable disadvantage that the 472 
students may be primed, thus obviating any analysis of absolute gains in understanding, 473 
by controlling the questions we remove a potential noise variable. Were one to introduce 474 
new questions, even logically similar ones, we cannot be certain that the change in score 475 
reflects a change in understanding, as we then need to add assumptions about the 476 
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understandability and comparability of different questions. If there were variability 477 
between pupils in the understandability of any new questions, we would have introduced 478 
an unnecessary noise variable. While our approach might affect interpretation of absolute 479 
change in scores, we are, however, interested in increase in response compared to other 480 
increases in response or as they correlate with another factor. We are not first and 481 
foremost interested in the absolute change per se. Put differently, even if all scores go up 482 
– possibly because the students better understand the same questions – the issue is why 483 
some students’ scores go up more than others.  484 
 485 
The median gap between pre and post assessment was 63 days.  We are confident that 486 
teachers did not “teach to the test” as the anonymity of students and schools in the study 487 
was explained to teachers prior to their agreeing to partake. Moreover, the teachers were 488 
instructed to teach their normal GCSE syllabus.  We also control for within class-effects 489 
which would remove any better-teacher effects, should such confound exist. 490 
 491 
Focus groups 492 
Focus groups were designed to better understand the responses found in the student 493 
questionnaires, i.e., why students were or were not accepting of evolution; how these 494 
views related to knowledge of evolution; how these related to knowledge of genetics; and 495 
what other factors are important. Seventy-six students were involved in 16 focus groups. 496 
These students were from 10 different schools. The largest focus groups contained 7 497 
students and the smallest, 2. All students were from groups identified as “higher-ability,” 498 
with most students being from among the top sets in each school. The majority of 499 
students were in Years 9, 10, and 11 and studying towards their GCSE examinations. Six 500 
students were in Year 12 and studying for A-Level exams. Most focus groups comprised 501 
students of the same age and from the same class, however there were 3 groups that 502 
contained a mixture of ages and classes. 503 
 504 
Teacher parameters 505 
To estimate teacher acceptance we conducted teacher surveys via an online MATE 506 
resource that we developed. The survey is “highly reliable”: evolution acceptance has a 507 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94 and G6 of 0.96 (maximum value is 1).   508 
 509 
Background information 510 
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A mixture of state, faith, and independent schools have been involved in this project. All 511 
schools are from the South of England and Mid and South Wales. All schools within the 512 
accessible area were invited but not all accepted. All are English language schools. 513 
Schools included students from socially and economically diverse communities, including 514 
rural, suburban, and inner city. A number of schools are single-sex. Although data were 515 
not collected specifically on student demographics, a wide range of ethnic backgrounds 516 
and faiths were represented. Background data on schools have been collected from 517 
inspection (OFSTED/ESTYN) reports, school websites, and from meetings with 518 
teachers. For further detail see 19. We do not release information on demographics on a 519 
school-by-school basis as this might impinge on anonymity of schools, teachers and 520 
pupils, anonymity that was guaranteed. 521 
 522 
Statistics. All statistics were conducted in R with data processing via Tcl scripts. Loess 523 
was performed using R using the loess function. We note that the loess method has the 524 
advantage over binning methods of not enforcing arbitrary bin sizes that can in turn 525 
distort proportionality between bins. Where rho is specified it may be assumed that the 526 
method was Spearman’s rank correlation. 527 
 528 
To test exclude between-class effects we consider each class in isolation and consider for 529 
each class the correlation of interest (e.g. between the normalised improvement in 530 
evolution understanding and the preteaching acceptance scores).  We then take the 531 
values of this correlation (via Spearman’s rank correlation) for all classes and test this set 532 
of intraclass rho values against a median correlation of zero using Wilcox signed rank 533 
test.  As the strength of this test is dependent on both the number of classes being 534 
considered and the number of students in any given class, we consider the test for a 535 
variety of minimum class sizes (from a minimum of 5 students in a class to a minimum 536 
of 15). 537 
 538 
Hartigan and Hartigan’s dip test29 was implemented in the R package diptest. The dip test 539 
metric is sensitive to sample size such that two otherwise identical distributions can 540 
report different dip scores depending on the sample size. To test for a difference 541 
between higher and foundation classes, we thus control sample size by randomly 542 
subsampling 172 from the 1055 higher ability students (without replacement) and 543 
calculated the dip score for this subsample, being identical in size to the foundation class.  544 
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Repeating this 10000 times we derive the distribution of dip scores of the population of 545 
higher ability students that is directly comparable to the dip score for the foundation 546 
class.  We calculate 95% confidence intervals using the quantile function in R.  We then 547 
compare the dip score of the foundation class against those confidence intervals and 548 
present the median of the dip scores of the subsamples.   549 
 550 
To calculate the significance of the difference in the frequency of low acceptors (score 551 
≤32) a nonparametric randomization was employed. We randomly reassigned the data to 552 
two paritons (1055 and 172 in size) without replacement, these being the sizes of the 553 
higher and foundation samples respectively.  For each randomised pair of partitions, we 554 
calculate the frequency of low acceptors in both and consider the modulus of the 555 
difference between these two as the reporting statistic.  We ask of 10,000 simulations 556 
how many have an absolute difference between frequencies that is greater than or as 557 
great as that seen in the real data.  If this number is n, with m simulations, P=n+1/m+1.   558 
To determine whether a correlation between x and y is significantly stronger or weaker 559 
than the correlation between z and y, we performed a nonparametric Monte Carlo 560 
simulation. We calculated the 2 Spearman correlations and asked about the difference in 561 
the Spearman rank coefficient. We then randomised the vector y, and considered for 562 
each randomised version the correlation between x and randomised y and z and 563 
randomized y. We again considered the modular difference in Spearman rho value for the 564 
correlation of these 2 individually against variable y (the mean difference in the simulants 565 
is zero). Repeating the simulation 10,000 times, we asked how often the modular 566 
difference was as great or greater than that observed in the real data. As we employed 567 
modular data, the test is 2-tailed. The type 1 error rate is then given by P = (n + 1)/(m + 568 
1), where n is the number of randomizations in which the diference is as extreme or 569 
more extreme than that observed in the real data and m the number of simulations. 570 
Randomization was done in all cases uses the sample function in R. Other tests are 571 
explained in text.   572 
 573 
Significance is taken at alpha <0.05.  574 
 575 
Item nonresponse levels were low. We considered alternative means to handle 576 
nonresponse, but as the numbers are so low, they make no difference to results (see prior 577 
analysis19 for further details including raw data files). 578 
 19 
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Figure legends 716 
 717 
Fig. 1 The relationship between the acceptance of evolution and the 718 
understanding of evolution prior to teaching. Here we present that scores for the 719 
preteaching acceptance of each pupil and the preteaching evolution understanding 720 
scores. Spearman’s rho = 0.22, P=9 x 10-15. The regression line is the best fit line of y 721 
predicted by x. However, as assumptions of linear regression are not fully met it is 722 
provided for illustrative purposes alone to indicate the trend. N=1227.  723 
 724 
Fig. 2 The stratification of evolution acceptance scores prior to teaching and 725 
teacher-derived classification of student ability (foundation or higher ability).  726 
Here we present that scores for the preteaching acceptance of each pupil stratified by 727 
teacher-derived classification of student ability visualised as violin plot.  Higher ability 728 
N= 1055, foundation, N=172. Median higher = 51, 95% CI 37.35 - 61.65; median 729 
foundation = 47, 95% CI 35 – 60. Mann Whitney U test, P=9 x 10-11. 730 
 731 
Fig 3. Relationship between change in understanding of evolution score and 732 
preteaching evolution understanding score.  Here we plot for each student the 733 
change in understanding of evolution score (post teaching score – preteaching score) 734 
against the preteaching understanding score.  The blue line is the loess regression line 735 
around which residuals are generated. Loess was run under default settings. Equivalent 736 
number of parameters=4.88, residual standard error = 1.289.  N=1227. 737 
 738 
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Fig 4. Normalised gain in evolution understanding owing to teaching is positively 739 
correlated with preteaching acceptance in evolution score. Here we plot the 740 
residuals of the loess regression (shown in Fig 3) as normalized gain in evolution 741 
understanding, as a function of preteaching acceptance of evolution. Spearman’s 742 
rho=0.17, P=4.6 x 10-9.  The regression line is the best fit line of y predicted by x. 743 
However, as assumptions of linear regression are not fully met it is provided for 744 
illustrative purposes alone to indicate the trend. N=1227. 745 
 746 
Fig 5. Normalised gain in genetics understanding owing to teaching is positively 747 
correlated with preteaching acceptance in evolution score. Here we plot the 748 
residuals of the loess regression of change in genetics understanding predicted by 749 
preteaching genetics understanding (normalized gain in genetics understanding), as a 750 
function of preteaching acceptance of evolution. Spearman’s rho=0.15, P=6.4 x 10-8.  751 
The regression line is the best fit line of y predicted by x. However, as assumptions of 752 
linear regression are not fully met it is provided for illustrative purposes alone to indicate 753 
the trend. N=1227. 754 
 755 
 756 
 757 
 758 
 759 
 760 
 761 
  762 
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Table 1.  The correlation between preteaching acceptance scores and normalised 763 
increase in evolution understanding in stratified analysis.  For each stratification we 764 
consider the Spearman rank correlation between preteaching acceptance score and the 765 
residuals from the loess of change in evolution understanding predicted by preteaching 766 
evolution understanding. Change is defined as post score – pre-teaching score. Rho is the 767 
Spearman rank correlation coefiicent, P the significance and N the sample size.  768 
 769 
Stratification Level Rho P N 
Teaching order Genetics first 0.18 3.5 x 10-7 776 
Evolution first 0.10 0.032 451 
     
Ability High 0.13 1.2 x 10-5 1055 
foundation 0.23 0.0029 172 
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